{"id":65954,"date":"2022-01-06T17:02:19","date_gmt":"2022-01-06T17:02:19","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/arabsiyonews.com\/?p=65954"},"modified":"2022-01-06T17:10:59","modified_gmt":"2022-01-06T17:10:59","slug":"is-ethiopia-preparing-for-war-on-somaliland","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/arabsiyonews.com\/index.php\/2022\/01\/06\/is-ethiopia-preparing-for-war-on-somaliland\/","title":{"rendered":"Is Ethiopia Preparing for War on Somaliland?"},"content":{"rendered":"

The Biden administration must reaffirm that the United States recognizes the immutability of Somaliland\u2019s (and Somalia\u2019s) recognized borders. It is time to put diplomacy first.by\u00a0Michael Rubin<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

BERBERA, SOMALILAND\u2014The Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa is quiet. Whereas a month ago, the Ethiopian Army appeared to be on the brink of defeat, an Iranian, Turkish, and Emirati airlift of drones and ammunition tipped momentum in favor of Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. But it will be a Pyrrhic victory for the disgraced Nobel Laureate<\/a>: Widespread reprisals and collective punishment have frayed Ethiopia\u2019s ethnic fiber beyond repair in not only\u00a0Tigray and Oromia<\/a>\u00a0but also among Ethiopia\u2019s other ethnic-based federal states. Simply put, dictators who create concentration camps for ethnic reprisal seldom can claim public adulation.<\/p>\n

To maintain power, Abiy must keep Ethiopia in a state of perpetual crisis. Enemies real and imagined will dominate public rhetoric. But the Tigray War highlighted another vulnerability: Ethiopia\u2019s lack of a port. Eritrea\u2019s independence\u2014and its success in a subsequent war with Ethiopia\u2014ended Ethiopia\u2019s outlet to the sea, and so Ethiopia turned to Djibouti, the independent city-state and port. Chinese investment underwrote a railroad and highway project, and today Djibouti\u00a0handles up to 95 percent<\/a>\u00a0of all of Ethiopia\u2019s inbound trade. As fighting expanded beyond Tigray, however, forces disrupted both rail and road links between Addis Ababa and Djibouti.<\/p>\n

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To correct this and distract his population with a new crisis, Abiy is setting the stage for a claim to Zeyla (Saylac), a sleepy port in northern Somaliland just about seventeen miles from the Djiboutian border. His supporters have begun to cite historic precedent: from the sixteenth to early nineteenth century, Zeyla was the main port serving the Ethiopian city of Harrar and points even further inland. Zeyla is also a focal point of Abiy\u2019s on-again, off-again discussion of\u00a0creating a new<\/a>\u00a0Ethiopian Navy<\/a>, a military service that makes no sense in an otherwise landlocked country.<\/p>\n

While Ethiopia is a continental giant\u2014after Nigeria, it has the largest population in Africa\u2014Somaliland is far smaller in both size and population. Zeyla itself is\u00a0relatively isolated<\/a>: The two nearest Somaliland cities\u2014Boroma and Berbera\u2014are 150 and 170 miles, respectively, away over rough terrain. It would take hours, if not days, for Somaliland to muster its forces to repel an Ethiopian invasion. While Ethiopian forces would also face rough and barren terrain, they would only need to drive 160 miles to reach Zeyla.<\/p>\n

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Compounding Zeyla\u2019s isolation are geopolitics. Somaliland may be among Africa\u2019s most democratic countries, but the republic\u2019s 1991 divorce from Somalia remains unrecognized. Today, alongside Taiwan, it is the world\u2019s most functional unrecognized state, with greater capacity and less corruption than both the Palestinian Authority or Hamas-leadership in Gaza, the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq, or the\u00a0Polisario Front<\/a>\u2019s Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic based in Algeria. That said, Somaliland\u2019s isolation has taken a toll on its military power, infrastructure, and economy, although it still fares better in these categories than some recognized states in west and central Africa.<\/p>\n

As important as geopolitical factors are alliances. While Abiy, angered at persistent human rights criticisms, has now turned his back on the United States and Europe in favor of autocratic backers like China, Turkey, Eritrea, and Iran, Somaliland has gone the other direction. The United Kingdom, Denmark, and Kenya all have offices in the Somaliland capital Hargeisa, and the European Union is also a frequent presence. Rather than accept bribes from Beijing as many African countries have, Somaliland chose Taiwan because of shared values. Shortly after, the Chinese foreign ministry sent a delegation in order to trade bribes for a policy change, but Somaliland\u2019s elected leadership sent them packing. China is also upset with Somaliland for commercial reasons: The newly-expanded port of Berbera increasingly competes with Djibouti. The United Arab Emirates\u2019 \u201ccorridor\u201d road from the port, which travels past a new UAE-funded airport to the Ethiopian border, makes Berbera more attractive. Abiy may calculate that if he makes a move on Zeyla, he will enjoy China\u2019s backing, if not to punish Taiwan than to prop up China\u2019s own investment in Djibouti.<\/p>\n

As he often does, Abiy confuses reality with wishful thinking. Djibouti is no stranger to ethnic tensions between Somalis, who rule the country, and Afars. To move on Somaliland would exacerbate those tensions, as Djiboutian Somalis have kin in Somaliland while many Afars have kin in Ethiopia. Any Ethiopian assault on Zeyla would likely reignite insurgency and destabilize Djibouti.<\/p>\n

Many in Washington might argue that the United States should have no interest in the Horn of Africa. They are simply wrong. Zeyla and Djibouti sit along the Bab el-Mandab, through which so much of the world\u2019s (and America\u2019s) seaborne trade flows. Empowering a China intent on denying sea lanes to American trade would hurt manufacturers across the United States. What happens in the tiny town of Zeyla will be felt from Somaliland to Shreveport and Djibouti to Denver. Destabilizing Djibouti and Somaliland, the two most stable countries in the Horn of Africa, will also unleash further migration flows in the Middle East and Mediterranean, each of which can destabilize countries and catalyze terror.<\/p>\n

However, should the Biden administration choose to be proactive, wise diplomacy can avert the crisis. More than eight months after Secretary of State Antony Blinken\u00a0appointed<\/a>\u00a0Jeffrey Feltman to be his special envoy for the Horn of Africa, Feltman has yet to visit Somaliland. He demurs that he has not had time, never mind that the country\u2019s main international airport is just a forty-five-minute flight from Addis Ababa, or a three-hour flight from Doha or Dubai. Perhaps Blinken\u2014whose Africa strategy omitted\u00a0mention<\/a>\u00a0of China\u2014is embarrassed by the fact that Somaliland has greater moral clarity than many in Washington when it comes to the merits of democracy over dictatorship.<\/p>\n

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